It introduces the context of South Korea, under the administration of Yoon Suk Yeol and influenced by U.S.-China competition, following the U.S. in reducing dependence on China, with critical minerals becoming the core of its economic security "de-risking" strategy. It elaborates that South Korea's critical minerals security strategy started late but developed rapidly, drawing lessons from Japan's model and leveraging international systems to reduce costs. It also points out the shift in traditional economic security research perspectives, emphasizing the importance of corporate participation for the effectiveness of industrial chain security strategies, introduces relevant research paradigms, and proposes that this article will examine the effectiveness and limitations of South Korea's critical minerals security strategy from both the national strategy and corporate participation levels.

I. Background of South Korea's Critical Minerals Security Strategy

It elaborates on the background of South Korea's critical minerals security strategy. South Korea lacks natural resources and has a high import dependence on China for critical minerals. After taking office, Yoon Suk Yeol pursued a "pro-U.S., anti-China" approach, following the U.S. "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and attempting to decouple from China in the critical minerals sector. South Korea's battery and electric vehicle industries are economic pillars, with supply chains dependent on critical mineral processed products imported from China, revealing vulnerabilities in ore supply and mineral processing. Although China is not the largest in reserves and extraction, it dominates the midstream processing through its advantages. South Korea's dependence on China is reflected in processing capacity; in 2023, a significant portion of its critical mineral-related products were imported from China, leading to a trade deficit with China.

II. South Korea's Government Strategy on Critical Minerals: Domestic Policies and Resource Diplomacy

Driven by the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, the South Korean government completed domestic legislation and policy formulation for its critical minerals strategy after 2023, selecting 33 critical minerals and focusing on managing 10 strategic critical minerals, establishing an early warning system. In 2024, it passed the "Special Act on National Resource Security" to promote resource security. The government introduced industrial support policies, improved government-enterprise cooperation models, and established KOMIR, exploring new cooperation models such as forming joint ventures with companies like LG Energy Solution. In 2025, it established a Critical Minerals Investment Committee and set up a Supply Chain Stabilization Fund to promote government-enterprise cooperation and overseas investments. In terms of resource diplomacy, South Korea strengthened bilateral cooperation with resource-rich countries, signing multiple agreements, particularly with Australia. Based on complementary relations, South Korea secured lithium raw material supplies from Australia. South Korea also actively participated in the U.S.-led "Mineral Security Partnership" under the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" framework, promoting the establishment of the "MSP Financial Network" during its rotating presidency to provide financing support for private enterprises.

III. South Korean Enterprises' Critical Minerals Layout: Market Orientation and Overseas Investment

It discusses the market orientation and overseas investment of South Korean enterprises in critical minerals layout. Firstly, it points out that mineral resource projects face obstacles for private enterprise investment due to high investment, high risk, and political instability in resource-rich countries. Although the South Korean government encourages overseas investment by enterprises, companies still prioritize their own interests, considering factors such as market access, profits, costs, and risks comprehensively. It then analyzes the impact of the U.S. "Inflation Reduction Act" on South Korea's critical minerals industrial chain. To meet the Act's requirements, South Korean battery companies adjusted their business strategies, reducing imports of critical mineral processed products from China while expanding investments in the U.S. market and restructuring their Chinese operations. Finally, it elaborates on the expansion of overseas investments by South Korean enterprises, using the industrial cooperation between South Korea and Australia as an example to illustrate how South Korean companies, based on price advantages and compliance with U.S. Act provisions, cooperate with Australia in areas like lithium ore supply to enhance mineral resource acquisition capabilities, aligning with the South Korean government's critical minerals security strategy.

IV. Effectiveness and Limitations of South Korea's Critical Minerals Strategy

Since implementing its critical minerals security strategy in 2023, South Korea has seen both effectiveness and limitations. In terms of effectiveness, by increasing ore imports from countries like Australia, Chile, and Argentina, South Korea achieved diversification in critical mineral import sources, with Australia becoming its largest supplier of lithium ore. In the midstream processing segment, South Korea reduced imports from China, turning instead to Australia, Chile, and others, and built domestic processing production lines, enhancing local processing capacity. Taking POSCO as an example, it established lithium hydroxide plants and nickel-cobalt-manganese precursor plants in South Korea, achieving a self-sufficient production system for raw material supply, intermediate processed semi-finished products, and cathode materials, thereby reducing dependence on imports from China.

However, South Korea's critical minerals strategy also has limitations. Despite progress in the upstream and midstream segments for minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt, South Korea still struggles to escape dependence on Chinese imports across the entire industrial chain for critical minerals like graphite and rare earths. China dominates in resource reserves, extraction volume, and processing capacity for graphite and rare earths, and South Korea's import dependence continues to rise. Furthermore, South Korea's industrial economic development is significantly affected by external environments, with its critical minerals strategy influenced by changes in U.S. policies. Adjustments in the Trump administration's energy policies, particularly the implementation of the "Big and Beautiful Act," which eliminated electric vehicle subsidies, impacted South Korean enterprises' investments and supply chain adjustments in the U.S., undermining the feasibility of South Korea's "de-risking" strategy towards China.

V. Conclusion

It summarizes the "de-risking" aspect of South Korea's critical minerals security strategy and its effects. In early 2026, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung visited China, and China-South Korea economic and trade cooperation returned to a normal track. Against the backdrop of growing technological capabilities, China and South Korea exhibit both competition and cooperation in high-tech fields like semiconductors and electric vehicles, with critical minerals supply chains becoming a significant issue. Since the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, South Korea implemented a "de-risking" strategy to reduce import dependence on China. Differing from U.S. and Japanese strategies, it is more proactive and focused on minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt. South Korea adopted a "government-led, enterprise-driven" model, advancing policy legislation and government-enterprise cooperation, with enterprises accelerating overseas investments and domestic construction. After 2023, South Korea's dependence on Chinese imports for critical minerals decreased, but in the long term, it remains difficult to fundamentally reverse this dependence, and the "de-risking" goal has not achieved substantive results. South Korea's policies are influenced by U.S.-South Korea relations and U.S. policies. During Lee Jae-myung's visit to China, the South Korean business community actively sought to deepen cooperation with China. In the future, South Korea's critical minerals policy is expected to return to a pragmatic development track.