Rare earth elements, as critical strategic resources, occupy a central position in the China-U.S. rivalry. This section reviews the historical evolution of the United States from its monopoly of the market during the Cold War to industrial relocation, as well as China's leading position after forming a complete industrial chain. It focuses on analyzing the policy foundation laid during Trump's first term through executive orders and the Defense Production Act to restart the Mountain Pass mine, the Biden administration's deepening of supply chain risk assessments, expansion of the critical minerals list, and construction of the "Minerals Security Partnership" through multilateral pathways, and the radical interventionist characteristics of the "whole-of-government strong intervention" during Trump's second term. It also reviews the current state of academic research on U.S. rare earth policy, noting that existing studies mostly focus on overall critical mineral strategies or regional analysis, while this article will systematically explore the motivations, pathways, and impacts of supply chain reshaping as its core theme.

I. Motivations for the United States to Reshape Rare Earth Supply Chains

This section systematically analyzes three core motivations for the United States to reshape rare earth supply chains. At the military security level, the United States has elevated rare earth supply chain security to the core tier of national security, viewing it as a key guarantee for maintaining absolute military superiority over China. As irreplaceable strategic resources for cutting-edge weapons such as F-35 fighter jets, nuclear submarines, and missile systems, 72% of rare earth raw materials for the U.S. defense industrial base rely on Chinese supply. RAND Corporation research warns that a 90-day supply disruption could lead to production halts at 78% of defense contractor production lines. This "asymmetric dependence" triggers strong security anxiety, with the United States believing that China can achieve non-kinetic strategic deterrence through supply chain control. At the technological hegemony level, rare earth elements are strategic cornerstones supporting technological breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and other key fields. The surging demand for rare earth permanent magnets in new energy vehicle motors and semiconductor production equipment, combined with China's 2025 export controls on semiconductor-related rare earth items directly impacting U.S. technology industries, forces the United States to seek supply chain autonomy and controllability to maintain core technological leadership. At the economic revival level, building a localized rare earth industrial chain serves the political goal of "Making America Great Again," representing both a strategic choice to promote manufacturing reshoring and correct economic policy toward China, and an economic consideration to capture the rare earth metals market projected to reach $33.7 billion and support the trillion-dollar semiconductor industry. Together, these three factors constitute a systematic strategic response by the United States to eliminate strategic vulnerability and sustain global hegemony.

II. Pathways for the United States to Reshape Rare Earth Supply Chains

This section systematically elaborates on three core pathways for the United States to reshape rare earth supply chains in the context of great power competition. First, strong state intervention in industrial development. The Trump administration constructed a policy toolkit through intensive executive orders and congressional legislation, such as the March 2025 executive order "Immediate Measures to Increase U.S. Mineral Production" invoking the Defense Production Act to provide loan support, and the July 2025 "Big and Beautiful Bill" appropriating $7.5 billion for critical minerals. Simultaneously, it established new public-private partnerships through capital injection and market guarantees, such as the Commerce Department providing $277 million in direct funding and acquiring a 10% stake in U.S. Rare Earth LLC, and the Defense Department reaching a ten-year procurement agreement with MP Materials and acquiring a 15% stake, using deep-binding models to eliminate market risks. Second, vigorously promoting onshore industrial construction. The U.S. Department of Defense has allocated over $439 million, striving to build a full-chain supply chain "from mine to magnet" before 2027. Specifically, this includes: upstream, launching the "Stockpile Program" providing $10 billion in loans for mining reserves and exploring rare earth extraction from waste streams; midstream, accelerating separation technology research and development, such as using digital twin technology to advance heavy rare earth separation; downstream, focusing on magnet production, with MP Materials' cooperation with General Motors and Noveon Magnetics' factory construction projects proceeding simultaneously. Meanwhile, increasing resource recycling capacity, such as granting REEcycle $5.1 million to build a commercial factory with annual production of 50 tons of rare earth oxides, and reaching a $500 million magnet recycling cooperation agreement with Apple. Third, constructing "de-Sinicization" bilateral and multilateral networks. At the bilateral level, in October 2025, the United States successively signed supply security frameworks with Australia and Japan, memoranda of understanding with Malaysia and Thailand, and in November signed a framework agreement with Saudi Arabia with plans to build the Middle East's first rare earth processing plant in Saudi Arabia, utilizing allied resources and geopolitical advantages to establish supply chain foundations. At the multilateral level, relying on the 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial Meeting to establish the "Resource Geostrategic Cooperation Forum," signing new agreements with 11 countries, promoting the G7 to make "reducing dependence on Chinese rare earths" a core issue, jointly formulating supply chain resilience action plans with the EU and Japan, and launching the Critical Minerals Initiative under the Quad framework, incorporating rare earth issues into institutionalized global cooperation networks.

III. Prospects and Impacts of U.S. Rare Earth Supply Chain Reshaping

This section analyzes the prospects and impacts of U.S. rare earth supply chain reshaping. Regarding prospects, through technological breakthroughs, policy drivers, and alliance coordination, the United States is accelerating the "de-Sinicization" process of global rare earth supply chains. Technological research and development has achieved substantial progress, with the Texas Round Top deposit successfully producing high-purity dysprosium oxide, with commercial production expected by 2028. Trump administration policies have greatly stimulated domestic industrial enthusiasm, achieving breakthroughs from "having mines but no chains" to "full-chain layout." Relying on the FORGE platform to integrate allied advantages, it is constructing a global rare earth supply chain network. Meanwhile, the United States has driven the development of material substitution and recycling technologies, including rare-earth-free magnet research and development and waste recycling utilization, further reducing dependence on China.

Regarding impacts, this initiative has evolved from industrial competition into profound geopolitical gaming. Globally, it has stimulated Southern resource countries' sovereignty consciousness and strategic gaming initiative, with countries such as Indonesia and Chile attempting to transform resource advantages into industrialization capital. It has accelerated seabed resource development and critical waterway competition, violating international maritime law and intensifying infrastructure competition. It has pushed supply chains from "efficiency priority" to "security priority," leading to camp-based and fragmented industrial chains and exacerbating geopolitical confrontation risks. For China, in the short term it is difficult to shake its dominant position, as China controls 99.9% of global heavy rare earth separation capacity and 85%–90% of rare earth magnet production, with the United States needing at least ten years to pose a substantial threat. However, in the long term it will weaken China's countermeasure capabilities and discourse power, as continued "de-Sinicization" may reduce the effectiveness of rare earths as strategic deterrent tools, and U.S.-Western pricing power arrangements may also damage global supply chain stability.

IV. Conclusion

This section analyzes the internal and external resistance faced by the Trump administration in reconstructing rare earth supply chains: internally, there are shortages of rare earth talent and labor, with over half of mining personnel retiring by 2029 and professional graduates continuing to decline; externally, international cooperation faces numerous obstacles, with large differences in resource endowments and interest demands among allies, and insufficient institutionalization and low decision-making efficiency in cooperation mechanisms. The section points out that competition and cooperation coexist in China-U.S. rare earth relations, and future bilateral strategic adjustments may bring space for pragmatic cooperation. It emphasizes that the essence of rare earth competition stems from the contest for technological dominance, criticizes the U.S. "China threat theory" and power politics for fragmenting global supply chains, and calls on China to maintain supply chain stability and promote the construction of a mutually beneficial and win-win new pattern of global critical mineral cooperation.